



Trilemma on governance deficit, the endsars protest and political insecurity in Nigeria: The international dimensions 2015 -2021

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Abstract

This paper delves on citizens' trilemma regarding governance deficits, the EndSARS protest and political insecurity in Nigeria with international dimensions in mind. The paper deploys theory triangulation via systems theory by David Easton (1997) that considers the political system in terms of input and output model through the behaviour of individuals, groups, organizations and its relationship to the society. This explains the accentuation of governance deficits by actions of political actors as fecundity to the EndSARS protest energized by the theory of connective action of Bennett and Segerberg (2012) and Pond & Lewis (2019). Connective action theory explains the interconnecting capacity of social media to harness people of different backgrounds within a short period of time into demanding for social change in any society. Both theories are boosted by the actualization theory of Abraham Harold Maslow (1908-70) that sees the achievement of self-esteem and self-actualization as the basis for human optimization of insatiable needs leading to crimes or protests against the state. Data for the study was generated only through secondary sources like textbooks, journal articles and verified internet links. The paper adopted descriptive method to qualitatively analysed data. Qualitative analysis of data reveals that the eruptive and remonstrative actions of subnational groups that breeds insecurity to be consequences of injustice, corruption, unemployment, poverty and hunger. The study concludes that issues of protests and insecurity occasioned by governance deficits cannot be shadowed by repressive instruments of government and recommends restructuring of the economy and provision of constant electricity to boost the production sector of the economy for Employment.

Keywords: the state, governance deficit, endsars, political-insecurity

Introduction

A trilemma presupposes a circumstance in which citizens are to choose amongst three undesirable conditions which are not circumspective of their collective good. These conditions have resulted in a dystopia that has characterized Nigeria in recent times. The conditions as undesirable as they are, have a historical contexts link to the state and citizens in modern societies. In modern society, the relationship between the citizens and the state is a function of the political system, the political culture and structures. If the system is dysfunctional, the relationship will induce asymmetries and creates wider economic gap and interest between political actors/ elites as a group and the rest of the citizenry. In event that the citizens become aware of this gap and asymmetries and if the policy makers of the state refuse to adjust positively in narrowing the gap, the citizens and the state becomes opposite. This shortcoming by the state to act detached from its citizens could be traced to the unintended consequences of the Westphalia states system. With the emergence of the Westphalia states system, the state becomes an indispensable minimum for interstates interactions, it has remained so even in the contemporary international system where these interactions are featured by a potpourri of values and interests that are occasionally interdependent yet defined by a plethora of occasions valued and shaped by entrenched power relations that are mutually exclusive. This presupposes the idea of

absolute sovereignty and equality within the international community. Because states do not share their sovereignty, they have acted and will persistently behave with determination which indicates the unwillingness to share the monopoly in the utilization of threats and the instrument of violence within their constitutional provisions to maintain order, peace and safeguard life and property. To do this, states explicate an unavoidable disposition towards power and security by engaging several sociopolitical systems, structures and strategies to obfuscate the fact that its character is totalitarian irrespective of the prevailing political system.

To demonstrate its unwillingness to share sovereignty, the state maximize power towards domestic bellicists who hitherto adjudged the state of acting aloof whenever it breaches its agreement with her citizens to provide and maintain infrastructures and ensure the absence of governance deficits. The dimensions to the breach of trust to protect lives and property often mirrors the character of the state, the political system and the extant political culture. In whatever form or level of political development, a state which showcases in contemporary international sociopolitical climates, the absence of constitutional liberty, freedom of press, unflawed political process and citizens' dissatisfaction has acted as unwilling midwife to bellicism and the terroristic activities of subnational groups whose emergence and assertive character have challenged the absoluteness of states' sovereignty. In Nigeria,

their emergence and actions, have largely been attributed by scholars to the elasticity of contradictions engendered by Islamic agenda, religious proselytism, primordial ties, injustice, poverty, illiteracy, the Almajiri beggars' system, disorientation and the lack of human capacity building (Umoh 2015:1) ^[33]. The actions of these subnational groups like the Fulani bandits, Fulani herdsmen and Fulani Bokoharam which have largely been tagged acts of violence, Umoh suggests is a response against the totalitarian character of the Nigerian state, tyrannical nature, corruption of political actors and governance deficits specially as magnified in the Buhari's regime. Before it metastasized, insecurity emanates from disorder and injustice within the state, and since states are the key actors in international system, the state cannot be shielded from international collaborators against its internal politics.

In the internal politics of the Nigerian state as developing economy, the actions of political actors like attempts to manipulate the constitution to stay in power, refusal to accept electoral defeats, acceptance of poor democratic culture as totem for the political process have shown that Nigeria remains a product of colonial mathematics alienated from and autonomous in relation to her citizens. Within the timeline of the present assessment in Nigeria, this alienation of the state from its citizens' torpedo nationalism and increase citizens' frustration that was expressed as the EndSARS protest. The timeline is of peculiar interest as it heralds the coming into power of president Muhammad Buhari a character drawn from the military past and believed by many to be stoical with answers to the Nigerian question. Again, the period becomes necessary for examination due to increased poverty, youth unemployment and the escalation in sectarian and ethnic violence. These challenges incubated the EndSARS protest that nearly upended the Nigerian society. It shows a period where the president acted in policy framing, focus and implementation as though the Nigerian state is a contractual Fulani entity. His unwillingness to develop the health, education and indeed nearly every sectors of the economy underscores Alapiki (2008) in Umoh (2015) ^[33] assessment that the Nigerian State is a product of the conquest and subjugation of several pre-colonial empires, kingdoms and communal states by the British colonial authority. They aver that in both form and character, governance in the colonial states were organized mainly on the basis of a functional notion of government backed by a well-developed coercive apparatus with a strong focus on revenue collection, maintenance of public order and establishment of essential infrastructural facilities, tailored towards resource extraction.

Similarly, Ibodje (2009:26) denudates any seeming obscurity in the assertion that governance in the Nigerian state presently is a bye product of colonial creation as he further insists that the Nigerian state is an output of bad governance extracted from colonial methods of administration that was superimposed on the diverse groups that are now Nigerians. He says that because it was superimposed, the state was detached from and autonomous of the Nigerian society and served as a utensil in the phalanges of the colonial elites who tempered with it at will, both in the interest of political juggernauts in metropolitan cities and for their personal aggrandizement. He explains that at independence, the indigenous elites, who

inherited power from the colonial elites, also inherited a state that was not only autonomous in relation to the society, but also one that could be manipulated by them for their selfish interest. Nigeria, a presumed giant of Africa going by her prominent Afrocentric foreign policies immediately after independence, she became a rentier state, reentered and awestruck by the oil boom of the early 1970s. The little hope and expectations from her earlier leaders have been stunted by oil boom corruption. Unaware of the future demands even as her foreign exchange was better from 1979 -1983 than the United States currency, she in error entente with some fossilized African and European states through aids and liberalized foreign trade with no legal means for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or Strategic Foreign Assistance (SFA), like in the case of South Africa during the Apartheid regime, Umoh (2020).

Some of these countries through multinationals companies like the Niger Company, Lever Brothers, Unilever, Shell Petroleum, Agip oil and British oil interfered in her political system and exploited her leaders' political naivety, jaundiced foreign economic policies and self-destructive domestic development strategies. From the Obasanjo military regime's 'Operation Feed the Nation', the Ibrahim Badamusi Babangida's 'Structural Adjustment Programme', (SAP) to Obasanjo's 'National Emergency Economic Development Strategy', (NEEDS), the travails of implementation are directly proportional to the failures of these policies and development strategies. These failures together with several other policies and strategies have given unnecessary fillip to population explosion, poverty, escalated crime rates, unemployment, drugs, and humans, trafficking, institutionalized corruption, remonstrations, protests and political insecurity. These indices of development in reverse are the fecundity which have given life to the violence in the country in general and specifically to the plague in the northeast known as 'jihadistic' or 'Allahic' terrorism.

Till the current assessment, Nigeria is still a beautiful example of a state with poor domestic policies, even as the eight largest crude oil producer among Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This is evidenced by her current status as one of the world capitals of poverty in 2019. The emergence of Buhari's regime in 2015 has been an indisputable source of widespread insecurity in the country due to his eruptive supports to Fulani armed groups like the herdsmen and the Boko-Haram sect. For (Adetula 2015) ^[1] and (Fineman 2018), the Bokoharam sect has been the number one harbinger of insecurity.

In a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria, political insecurity can be said to be occasioned by the tussle for power and struggle for governmental position by political actors. At the time of this assessment, political insecurity is shaped by avalanche of social determinants ranging from ethnic, religious, and political ties in attempts to control the affairs of government. These determinants are popularized by Fulani people in government of Nigeria and supported by increased poverty, unemployment and crimes in Nigeria. The fusion of these determinants was expressed by the End SARS protesters. The EndSars protest although poorly handled by the organizers could not have been as influential as it were without

international collaborators. Upon the above, the paper seeks to address the international dimensions to governance deficits, the EndSARS protest and political insecurity in Nigeria between 2015-2021.

Statement of the Problem.

If zoomed into critical examination, politics in Nigeria from independence will clearly extrapolate an undeniable recurring themes of violence and insecurity along ethno-religious and political party lines, both in how the violence manifested and the political economy of its resolution. Of familiar concern is the display of citizens' cumulative frustration expressed partly as the EndSARS Protest. The protest although loomed in the fabrics of antipolice brutality was tailored by governance deficit and subsumed in political insecurity occasioned by assumed Fulani hegemony with international dimensions. Political insecurity therefore, is shaped by socio-political contexts like inter-ethnic distrust and the quest for regional dominance that could be traced, in part at least, to the lack of a unified national focus of political actors before independence. Other reasons emanate from the fierce inclinations and struggles to acquire, control and maintain political power at all cost and these have affected the credibility of Nigerian politics and as such brought about political insecurity. Etannibi (2004)^[16] posited that Nigeria politicians perceived politics and political office as investment and as an avenue for the acquisition of extra ordinary wealth (through corruption) which they think is not possible through other forms of legitimates vocation and enterprise. In the Nigerian context therefore, politics has become a means of production and political insecurity a consequent of the struggle for political power, ethno-religious dominance and wealth through the use of any instrument of arms. Political insecurity link to the Buhari's regime can be explained by the increase in crime rate, poverty index, unemployment and low per capital income, poor Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Fulani religious violence. The surge in treasonable crimes like kidnapping, banditry, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, land grabbing and rape are derivatives of the support of the Fulanis in government to Islamic armed groupings leading to the proliferation and trafficking of arms especially in northern Nigeria.

Factors fuelling and escalating political insecurity have historical contexts link to international collaborators and dimensions. From the killer herdsmen in Nigeria and herders in other African countries like Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Islamic terrorist groups with links to Islamic fundamentalist groupings in the Middle East to Fulani bandits. Example of these linkages can be observed in the aftermath of announcement of the 2011 presidential result won by Goodluck Jonathan of PDP against CPC candidate Muhammadu Buhari that led to serious protests degenerating into sectarian and ethnic violence and killings by the Islamic Almajiri in the Northern states of Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Jigawa, Gombe, Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger and Yobe resulting in more than 65,000 displaced people and over 800 deaths. Umoh (2021)^[36] and Umoh, Poroma, and Deedam (2019)^[32] infer that political insecurity, just like resource conflicts in Nigeria are routine occurrence oscillating between public policy lacuna and the failure of implementation. This

has intense meaning in the international dimensions to the political insecurity in Nigeria.

These challenges have made scholars to Examine the relationship between governance and insecurity in Nigeria. Scholar like Emeodu (2019)^[17], examined the linkages between extreme poverty, politics and insecurity in selected local government in Rivers state. Sambo and Ebeku (2020) x-rayed variables like kidnapping, armed banditry, oil theft, and cybercrime as indices that breeds insecurity and underdevelopment in Nigeria. Olanbanjo and Eze (2014)^[29] traced political insecurity in Nigeria to when the federal structure was bequeathed on Nigeria and the incursion of the military into governance, Judex (2019)^[23] went on factors responsible for political economic crimes in Nigeria, while Tony (2019)^[31] blame the political economy of corruption and unemployment as catalysts to political insecurity. In order to best understand the phenomenon and bridge the gap, an interrogation of the thrust of the argument of these researches have shown that even as the scholars adopted many theoretical explanations to the rise of insecurity in general and how it should be addressed, none had evaluated the links between governance deficit, and the End SARS protest, neither did they interrogate the roles of international collaborators in the End SARS protest and political insecurity in Nigeria between 2015 -2021 This is the emphasis and focus of this review

Operationalization of concept.

This is the technical cum scientific application of constructs to defined variables within the contexts of their usage in explaining a phenomenon.

The state. Although the explication of the state as a phenomenon has attenuated through a battery of peer review, its usage here in the light of the Nigerian state refers to an ahistorical and nocuous contraption that emerged outside the culture and traditions of the many kingdoms and nations that are now Nigeria to assuage interclass antagonism with a bias disposition in favour of the ruling class. These biases have eventuated contradictions that resonates as governance deficits. Governance deficit. Structural imbalance in the implementation of policy occasioned by entrenched misappropriation of resources by government decision makers and political actors resulting to deficiency in leadership and quality of life of the citizenry.

EndSARS-Protest. A spontaneous, connective, temporal, reactionary and remonstrative civil umbrella through which citizens demonstrated their determination to participate in public policy implementation to end police brutality and checkmate governance deficits.

Political-insecurity. The extent to which politicking is deployed to cause disorder in the polity so as to enshrine sectional, party or group hegemony through the grasping and manipulation of the state's security structures.

Theoretical anchorage

For an academic clutch to the trilemma and relationship between governance deficit, the EndSars protest and political-insecurity with emphasis on the international dimensions, the paper adopts Theory triangulation through the systems theory by David Easton (1997) that considers the political system in

terms of an input and output model via the internal behaviour of individuals, groups, organizations and its relationship to the society. The theory assumes that the functionality of a political system is consequent upon the capability of the system to convert the inputs (demands and supports) to outputs (authoritative decisions) that please majority of the people in the polity (Enemuo, 1999). The theory emphasizes social equilibrium. Scholars use this theory to view societies within an organic perspective; that is, as systems made up of interdependent parts tending towards stability. To the functionalists, if conflict arises, it is seen either as “abnormal” or as a means by which temporary strains between elements are being reduced in a move toward greater equilibrium. One of the basic unit of analysis is governance, its relation to development and citizens dissatisfaction expressed in protests like the EndSars protest and the impacts of international collaborators to making or marring the system and its various parts with reference to the contributions they make to the system as a whole, (Umoh, 2015, pp. 2 – 3) ^[33]. To (Nna. 2004) ^[28] this implies that every social phenomenon exists within a given environment where it is an integral part interacting and relating with other parts in a symbiotic manner to reinforce and sustain itself and other constituents. In this article, the system theory therefore is action driven and thus collapses into the theory of connective action by Bennett and Segerberg (2012) ^[6] and Pond & Lewis (2019) which define connective action by its anatomy and assumes that political actions could be carried out by collective action with minimum personal and collective risk through the modern tools of connectivity. This is explained further by Bennett and Segerberg (ibid) that to understand connective action one needs to Explore the ways in which modern technologies aid personalized grievances in ways similar to actions that were witnessed during the Arab spring. Pond and Lewis (2019) explained that the theory of connective action advances the logic of collective action through the social media that enables social media political action to be regarded as catalyst for the success of social movements.

One of the affordances of social media is that it offers new opportunities for social action (McCarthy, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bluic, 2014); it can increase an individual's social capital by expanding their network (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman, & Robinson, 2001); it can also provide creative new platforms for social organization (Dessewffy & Nagy, 2016). Drawing on the various online social movements that occurred at the dawn of the 21st century, Castells (2015) theorized that by empowering social movements, social media offer a path for reconstructing the entirety of humanity by creating a new path for society that is already limited by systemic obstacles. Conversely, social media has eliminated the top to bottom structure of governance where leadership attempt to alienate the people and obfuscate distrust through propaganda and intimidation. For Moreno-Almeida & Banaji (2019) ^[26] is reconstructive of the alienated link between leaders and the led. Both theories synergize with the actualization theory by Abraham Harold Maslow (1908-70). The theory holds that people will do whatever it takes to be whosoever and whatsoever they want in life. This, Maslow contended that insatiable human needs are to be blamed and not necessarily

human scale of preference. Maslow went on to postulate a gradation of needs which includes the need for self-esteem and the need for self-actualization and posit that these ‘two needs’ basically the pull factors to achieving self-esteem and self-actualization even if it has to do with committing crime.

The consideration of theory triangulation in the article is informed by the descriptive nature of the three theories and their attempt in highlighting factors that are responsible for regulating and maintaining the system, while at the same time focusing on the changes that social media connectivity could bring to political decision which take place within the system. Triangulation of the three theories also offers critical assessment of personal and collective safety of citizens involve in protests for self-esteem and self-actualization through social media in order to bring changes in governance in the society even if it includes crimes against the state. These changes could be distal or proximal to socioeconomic determinants of governance deficits like corruption, poor gross domestic product (GDP), poverty, youth unemployment, workplace environment and condition of the paramilitary forces. Along a continuum vis-à-vis poor to excellent. Theory triangulation shows specific roles of each of theories to the understanding of the relationship between parts/components of the Nigerian society which includes protesters, news media, family, education, information management, subnational groups regarding governance and insecurity. It further watered emphasis on institutional collaboration in the delivery of public goods and good governance

Governance Deficits and the EndSars Protests

Good governance from the lenses of state specificity would dissuade the trilemma on deficits, protests and political insecurity. Good governance can be gleaned or measured from a variety of determinants which indicates positive institutional and structural arrangements in government decision making processes, policy formulation, implementation, human capacity building, workers development, information management and the character of the leader that shapes leadership within a political system. This arrangement can be distorted by continued self-enrichment of political actors via primitive accumulation and administrative corruption like those which birthed the End Sars-Protets. The End Sars protest can thus be liken to any spontaneous, temporal, reactionary and connectively remonstrative civil umbrella through which citizens demonstrate their determination to participate in public policy implementation to end police brutality and checkmate governance deficits in any social formation. The End Sars protests generated serious security and economic challenges in its wake. Although writers and political analysts like Chris (2020), Chris (2020) ^[9], Hyde (2020) ^[19] and Jacob Olatunji, (2020) ^[22] on the End Sars fiasco erroneously attributed the cause(s) of the protest only to incidences of police brutality and traces its origin to twitter protest against complains by Nigerians on the victimization of their relations by the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), it is not the position of this paper to interrogate the End Sars campaign as the basis for political insecurity, but to show a relationship between governance deficits as an harbinger to the protests and international collaborators as catalyst to the political actions in the country.

Magdalene (2020) [25] suggests that the protest was a call by the youths for the disbandment of the Nigeria’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) while Dambo (2020) [11] intimated that the protest began as a result of social media involvements. Granted, social media have accentuated protests since the Arab spring in the gulf states, however, the protest need to be premised on governance deficits since Nigeria’s 1999 return to democracy in general and the mismanagement of public funds in president Buhari’s regime. The EndSars cannot be said to be ahistorical and could not have mushroomed overnight, it was induced by a continued mis-governance of the polity by different political actors from Obasanjo in 1999 to Buhari in 2015. The protest unveiled a toga which hitherto concealed the zenith of poverty, youth unemployment, illiteracy problem, hunger and cybercrime. It was citizens’ expression of frustration. Although the EndSars protests could be likened to a modern peasant protest due to lack of defined leadership and a holistic focus, it however presented additional evidence that social media could mobilize people of diverse backgrounds to promote policy activism. It also demonstrated the disadvantage of visual leadership in organizing serious pro lumpen remonstrations by the social media generation in advancing social change through connective action unlike defined patterns evident in other revolutions like the Arab spring or organized labour protest like those of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC). About connective action of visual activism, one can easily observe that online networks are linkages that become visible when members and non-members of a

movement collectively participate in advancing causes. Thus, the logic of connective action recognises social media as an organising platform where participating individuals are self-motivated to freely express and share view(s) (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012) [6]. The EndSars protest was a connective action and not a collective action. What separates connective action from collective action is the extent of disorder via the absence of formal or organised structure that characterizes traditional organized activism like pressure groups and civil strike actions. Again, connective activism is said to be driven by the personal experiences of the participants in the movement. What this means is that, actions taken are spurred by vested interests of the participants. For Caraway (2016) [7] these interests are the content shared by participants in networked movements to promote connective action.

**The End Sars protests and political insecurity in Nigeria
The international dimensions**

Without collaborators, both local and international, the protest wouldn’t have sustained its momentum beyond 76hrs. As a connective action that was poorly executed, the EndSars was not entirely extemporaneous. The international dimensions to the protest is located on the collaborators who in one way or the other influence the connective nature and processes of the protests. The connections between internal and international actors and the protest itself can be deduced from myriads of supports ranging from logistics, finance, medical, legal, food and information from over 10 organisations.

Table 1: Collaborators in the EndSars Protest

Organizations	Function During EndSars protest
Amnesty international	Listing and cataloguing of human rights violations
Human Right watch	Documented police brutality before and during the EndSars in collaboration with the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN) and the Human Rights Social Development and Environmental Foundation (HURSDEF)
EndSARS Response	Directed support and funding mechanism, coordinate logistics, food, healthcare and legal aid in multiple states in Nigeria
Feminist Coalition	Led emergency funding mechanism and logistic support and help raised more than 70m naira(\$180,000 as @ 2020) and disbursed more than 20m in seven days for medical cost for the injured and illegally detained.
Mentally Aware	Offered free therapy to traumatized, detained or harassed protesters.
Socioeconomic rights and accountability project (SERAP)	Filing multiple suits against government on behalf of extorted detained or harassed protesters, pressuring government to fulfil governance promises
Endsars Legal Aid	Organized over 700 volunteers to get every illegally detained protester out of police custody
The Food Coven	Provided food and water in multiple states
Flutter Wave	Provided Donation Of 2m Starting By Its Staff, Provided Healthcare, Coordinated Donation From South Africa, The US and EU
Dominions pizza and Cold Store Creamery. Twitter media.	Donated free pizzas and ice Unveiled emoji for the EndSARS protest.

Source: Authors Compilation (2021).

Although The build up to the protests was not action specified, yet certain redline crossing by both security forces and political actors neglected the negative barometric pulse of the citizens. Actions like failed political promises to constituents by members of parliament and legislature, police extortion, profiling, brutality, unjust and extended detention of suspects and the use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. This position is corroborated by two Nigerian human rights organizations, the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN) and the Human Rights Social Development and

Environmental Foundation (HURSDEF) contained in the Amnesty International report that the Nigerian police deploy torture to force confessions out of suspects and uses these confessions in courts as basis for conviction (Amnesty International [AI], 2016). The demands of the protesters included; (a) Justice for all deceased victims of police brutality and compensation for their families.(b) The immediate release of all arrested protesters in Nigeria.(c) Setting up an independent body within ten (10) days that would oversee the investigation and prosecution of all reports of police

misconduct in Nigeria.(d) In line with the Police Act, the need for Psychological evaluation and retraining of all disbanded SARS officers before redeployment to other units, (e) Finally, adequate wage increase. The EndSars protest as conceptually developed on the evidence of Governance deficits occasioned by entrenched corruption can be located in the following indices. Poverty, hunger, abuse of power, poor GDP and political insecurity

Poverty

Table 1 below shows poverty differential by zones. The poor are those whose poverty index move along a continuum from conventional, relative to the abject. Poverty is a precarious situation of lack and limited access to basic necessity of life. It is a state of lack of material things of life that leads to social exclusion which culminates to relegation that results to noiselessness, vulnerability and less relevance in any society. Poverty connotes a situation that humiliates and weakens one’s inability to fend for and defend oneself. In a corrupt regime like the Buharis regime, poverty indicate vulnerability and easy prey for police extortion and victimization. it acts as pull factor to crime and insecurity. The poor are easily identified through indices such as residence in shanty shelters, tattered clothing’s, illiteracy like Muslim Almajiris, source of income via menial jobs, and the inability to pay health or education bills etc.

Table 2: Poverty Rates (2018) in Nigeria by Geo-Political zones

S/N	Geo-political zone	Percentage
1	North-West	77.7%
2	North-East	76.3%
3	North-Central	67.5%
4	South-East	67%
5	South-South	63.8%
6	South-West	59.1%

Source: UNDP (2018)

Poverty and hunger indexes in Nigeria two years before the EndSars underscore the source of the frosty relationship between the citizens and their loyalty to the state. This in part eventuated pockets of insecurity. From Fulani bandits believed to be abandoned political thugs after the 2015 presidential elections to the secessions activism of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPoB) and Ododuwa Republic in south-western Nigeria, poverty and hunger helps swell the ranks and file of recruits.

Corruption

Since politics is considered a means of production, the productive forces and relations of politics are explained by the

Table 4: Gross Domestic Product of Nigeria by Geopolitical Zones 2018

Geo-political zones	GDP (Billion)	Geo-political zones	GDP (Billion)	Geo-political zones	GDP (Billion)
South East	\$8,687	South West	\$2,848	North East	\$2,501
Abia	\$14,212	Ekiti	\$8,414	Gombe	\$4,713
Imo	\$2,732	Ondo	\$7,280	Bauchi	\$2,011
Ebonyi	\$4,396	Osun	\$16,121	Yobe	\$5,175
Enugu	\$6,764	Oyo	\$10,470	Borno	\$6,764
Anambra		Ogun	\$33,679	Adamawa	\$3,397
		Lagos		Taraba	
Total	\$36, 791		\$78, 812		\$24, 561

Source: Author’s adaptation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nigerian_states_by_GDP

penchant of actors to appropriate the commonwealth to themselves. This phenomenon has been made cultural specifically since 1999 during the Obasnjó’s regime, hopes of reprieve deducted from President Buharis campaign promises were squashed as the system technically constrained any attempt at real change. Corruption limits Citizens access to governance dividend and widen the gap between the *have-more* and the *have-less*. This deprivation in part gave fecundity to the EndSars protest and further increased crime rate.





Fig 1: Report on Economic Crime by the EFCC from 2015 -2019
Source: <https://transparencit.com>



Source: <https://transparencit.com>

Fig 2: Report on Economic Crime and Conviction Cases by the EFCC from 2015 -2019

The above evidence is veridical as they are indicting of the Buharis regime. The spike in economic crime in 2019 is indicative of those factors like hunger, unemployment and criminality by security forces that culminated into the assertive and aggressive character of the EndSars protesters. It shows the failure on the part of government to checkmate corruption even within the ruling political party – the All Peoples Congress.

Table 3: Crime Index by Type in Nigeria

S/N	Type of Crime	Index (%)
1	People using and dealing on drugs	71.49
2	Vandalism and theft	76.74
3	Violent crime such as assault, armed robbery and kidnappers	79.74
4	Corruption and bribery	88.36


Source: Authors Adaptation from Onuchuku, (2016).

The table indicate a digression of GDP which point to poor per capital income due to corruption and unemployment. Economic lack and deprivation is known to have the capacity in drastically reducing the options of many young Nigerians leading to frustration that could easily be expressed in violence actions as seen in the EndSars protests. The argument above shows a plausible convergence with the deductions from the structural violence paradigm, that individual or group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization, can be used as mobilizing instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist or social media accentuated violence. The prevalence of this factors within the Nigerian context, together with other factors like religion and ethnic solidarity eventuated political insecurity.

Political-insecurity

This is insecurity or violence perpetrated by people or governments to achieve political goals. It can be described as violence used by a state against other states (war) or against non-state actors (most notably police brutality, counter-insurgency or genocide). It can also be described as politically motivated violence by non-state actors against a state like the EndSars protest, rebellion, rioting or against other non-state actors. Non-action on the part of a government can also be conceptualized as a form of political violence, such as the refusal to eliminate famine or denying relief resources to politically identifiable groups or internally displaced persons within their territory.

Due to the imbalances of power between state and non-state actors, political violence or insecurity often takes the form of a synchronous warfare where neither side is able to directly assault the other, instead each party may deploy subversive tactics such a terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and often include attacks on civilian or non-combatant targets that are perceived as proxy for the opposing faction. This explains the disruptive and destructive actions of the EndSars protesters on politicians’ investment and police stations in many states of the federation. Political insecurity can equally ensue when many groups and individuals believe that their political systems will never respond to their demands and thus believe that violence is not only justified but also necessary in order to achieve their political objectives. By the same logic, states equally adopt political insecurity or Governments violence in order to intimidate their populace into acquiescence.



Source: Authors Adaption from Umoh (2020)

Fig 3: Sources of political insecurity by % of intensity in Nigeria

The major causes of insecurity in Nigeria need not be rigorously explained as the above diagram is self-explanatory. However, if the general insecurity facing Nigeria is collocated with Fulani jihadism; militia, banditry, killer herdsman and terrorism, a diachronic analysis would reveal that the Buhari’s regime has made leaders of armed groups millionaires. Conversely, the thematic relationship between the Endsars protests and political insecurity is made manifest through the utterances of Fulani as heads of the Nigerian security forces. As a consequent, many disadvantaged citizens of Southern Nigeria are not assessed by the content of their character, but the rhetoric of the Nigerian civil war via upended politics. In the light of this, it would seem therefore, that the Nigerian state rewards violence more than peace.

Conclusion

Trilemma on governance deficit, the EndSars protest and political insecurity represents a difficult choice between a wrecked ship, the euphemistic devil and the deep blue Sea. Analyses however have shown that the idea that democratic governance is participatory presupposes the protection of citizens’ interest and the promotion of their rights and wellbeing. Good governance therefore, encourages patriotism and nationalism. The opposite of good governance can be ascertained by the prevalence of governance deficits. Governance deficits occasioned by corruption and nepotism encourages citizens’ frustration and gives fecundity to remonstrative activities of subnational groups. These activities are not only eruptive of or a morass to development, they predict and support political insecurity. Conversely, recurring themes of human rights abuses, injustice, police brutality and corruption in governance are to be blamed for the EndSars protests. These themes suggest a warning that in any a social formation where justice is denied, where poverty is reinforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that the society they belong is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob, and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe.

Recommendations

The trilemma having been solved from the analysis, the paper recommends thus; Decentralization of political power to give autonomy to the three tiers of government (the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary). Restructuring of the economy to encourage higher productive capacity of both the public and the private sectors. Provision of constant electricity to boost the manufacturing sector of the economy and expand employment. Institutional independence to fight corruption, prosecute defaulters and rewards patriotic law abiding citizens. Reformation of the Nigerian police force.

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