The purpose of this paper is to summarise current research on local and state government accountability in India. We'll take each of these in turn: low voter participation and ignorance; capture by elites; ideology, honesty, and competency of political groups and electoral candidates; clientelism and corruption and vote-buying; and so on. We begin with an explanation of the relevant departure from the Downsian paradigm, then move on to a discussion of the empirical evidence available in the Indian context for each of these potential "distortions," and finally, we discuss the consequences of policy interventions related to these potential "distortions." The section concludes with a brief overview of the lessons taken away and the follow-up inquiries they prompt. This paper evaluates the available data from the Indian context to discuss numerous possible factors for the failure of elections as a vehicle for imposing government accountability to its citizenry. This research makes a contribution by summarising and providing context for current studies on political and economic issues confronting municipalities and states in India.